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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT APPROVES A
CONTROVERSIAL POLICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT TACTIC USED
ON MISSOURI HIGHWAYS CODE NAME: “GOTCHA!” A CASE
NOTE ON STATE v. MACK

The scenario is simple. Any ordinary citizen operating a car could walk, or
more precisely drive, right into it. “It” is what courts and police alike have
termed a “ruse checkpoint.” Although several states have tweaked the
checkpoint procedure to fit their state’s individual goals, the basic premise
remains constant. The story goes something like this: a motorist sees a sign
posted on a highway alerting him that there is a narcotics checkpoint at an exit
farther down the road. The motorist now has a decision to make. The driver
can, for either legitimate or perhaps illegitimate reasons, decide to exit the
highway and avoid the upcoming checkpoint. Once the motorist exits the
highway, however, he is surprised to find that he has driven right into the
checkpoint he sought to avoid by exiting in the first place. The motorist has
just succumbed to the premise behind the program, or put another way,
“Gotcha!”
The so-called “ruse checkpoint” described previously is a tactic used by
police in an effort to assist in America’s War on Drugs.1 Few individuals
would deny that drug use is both a prevalent and an increasing problem in the
United States. Police departments across the country, including those in the
state of Missouri, hold the belief that this relatively new brand of police tactic
will significantly disrupt drug flow in the country. Ideally, although not
practically, the threat of these checkpoints causes “people carrying narcotics
[to] become erratic, exit off the interstate, throw the narcotics out . . . cross the
median and go back in the opposite direction.”2 Once a driver exhibits such
erratic behavior, the police can pounce. The problem with such a scenario,
however, is that few drivers display such obviously suspicious conduct. Many
unsuspecting drivers do not realize they are in the trap until they are speaking
with a police officer. A further problem with these checkpoints is that police
are usually working with a preconceived bias that any individual exiting the
highway is hiding something. Such a prejudice obliterates an individual’s
Fourth Amendment protection where seizures are generally unreasonable
without a requisite amount of individualized suspicion.3 To further muddy the
1. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
2. United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 355 (4th Cir. 2000).
3. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
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waters, police have also used “mixed-motive” checkpoints,4 which may have a
constitutional purpose, such as a driver’s license stop, but they also have an
unconstitutional purpose, such as intercepting illegal narcotics. With police
enforcement utilizing various types of ruse checkpoints, a motorist is left to
guess as to the extent of protection he is afforded under the Constitution.
Although the use of ruse checkpoints is more of a recent phenomenon,
roadblock jurisprudence has received substantial treatment in American
courtrooms. After various decisions, some upholding certain types of
checkpoints and roadblocks while disapproving of others, the United States
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the issue in the November 2000 case of
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.5 The Court there held that checkpoints
designed with the primary purpose of general crime prevention, as is the case
with most “ruse checkpoints,” are a violation of an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights.6
Although those in the legal community with an interest in roadblock
jurisprudence hoped Edmond had answered the difficult issues left surrounding
roadblock cases, the Missouri Supreme Court demonstrated that Edmond left
some wiggle room when it handed down a 4-3 decision approving
suspicionless “ruse checkpoints” on Missouri roadways.7 The majority in
Mack found distinguishing characteristics between the case before it and
Edmond that justified a contrary ruling.8 This case note intends to take a closer
look at the rationale driving the decision in Mack and suggests that a blanket
rule prohibiting all deceptive checkpoints, such as the one in Mack, is the best
way to halt even further erosion of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights
when vehicle checkpoints are involved. This case note will begin by
examining some basic Fourth Amendment tenets in Part I and then proceed to
examine some of the principal cases that created the area of law referred to as
“roadblock jurisprudence” in Part II. Parts III and IV will conclude with an indepth look at Mack and analyze why “ruse checkpoints” should be abolished as
a form of police tactic altogether.

4. See Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1995).
5. 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000). (The checkpoint in Edmond, unlike the one to be discussed in
Mack, was not a ruse checkpoint.).
6. Id. at 41-42. The Court held the checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment
because the primary purpose of the checkpoint program was ultimately indistinguishable from the
general interest in crime control. Id.
7. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 710-11. Justice Limbaugh wrote the majority opinion and Justices
Benton, Holstein, and Price concurred. Justice Stith dissented in a separate opinion in which
Justices White and Wolff joined.
8. See id. at 710.
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I. BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL TENETS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
One of the wonderful aspects of living in America is that citizens are
afforded the highest degree of protection of their individual liberties and rights
of privacy. The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect such rights. The
Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.9

The various types of checkpoints discussed throughout this note share the
common bond of having Fourth Amendment implications. Courts determined
long ago that roadblocks and checkpoints constituted a “seizure” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.10 The principal Fourth Amendment issue
most courts are left to face in roadblock and checkpoint cases is whether or not
the checkpoint system in place is “reasonable” according to the language of the
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment requires all searches and seizures
to be reasonable.11 This note focuses primarily on roadblocks and vehicle
checkpoints; the lion’s share of the analysis will examine the reasonableness of
initial stops or “seizures.”
Most judicial interpretations have classified searches and seizures as
reasonable so long as some quantum of individualized suspicion was present.12
Thus, an officer may constitutionally conduct a brief, investigatory stop when
he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.13
However, because courts began to relax the once-stringent standards of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause, the checkpoint decisions have
become harder to decide in a consistent manner.14 Courts have overlooked the
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976). The Brugal court added,
“[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only
for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitute[d] a seizure of a person within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 2000).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
14. The Court notably carved its exceptions to the probable cause and suspicionless search
analysis in three similar cases. See generally Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Camara v.
Mun. Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967). These three cases discussed the possibility of an “administrative” need to
enforce government building code regulations that would justify the relaxation of the
individualized suspicion and warrant standards. Elaborating further on the “administrative
exception” were the cases of New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987), which discussed
administrative inspection of “closely regulated businesses,” and Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
501 (1978), which discussed the fire department’s warrantless re-entry to investigate the burning
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absence of warrants and individualized suspicion requirements in various
settings. Justice Scalia in California v. Acevedo, commented that the warrant
requirement had become “so riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically
unrecognizable.”15 Even though the Court has developed certain exceptions to
the warrant and individualized suspicion requirements, including “special
needs” exceptions,16 administrative policy exceptions,17 and certain roadblock
or checkpoint exceptions for border-patrol18 and sobriety19 enforcement, they
are still the primary defenses citizens of this country have against invasions
against their privacy rights, and it is still held in the highest regard.20
Police ruse checkpoints present an intriguing problem that courts now must
face. The ruse checkpoints do attempt to combat a societal ill in much the
same way as the checkpoints in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte21 and
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz22 did. The courts have the option
of creating yet another exception for these drug interdiction ruse checkpoints,
but this begs the question of how far the courts can go before all Fourth
Amendment safeguards are gone. A recent article by Craig Bradley highlights
the difficulties that courts, especially the United States Supreme Court, have
had with this topic.23 Bradley identified a theme that developed on the
Supreme Court after the arrival of Justice Stephen Breyer, where the Court
“consistently resist[ed] attempts by police to increase their power to interfere

of a furniture store. Another exception developed subsequent to those decisions, and is now
known as the “special needs” exception. The cases of New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
and Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), which involved searches in a school
setting, and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), which involved
mandatory urinalyses testing in an employment setting, further chipped away at the
individualized suspicion rule and the warrant requirement. For a more in-depth look at both the
administrative exception and the special needs exception, see Leslie P. Butler, Note, City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond: An Unprecedented Use of “Primary” Purpose Leaves Wide Open the
Door for “Secondary” Problems, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 175, 178 n. 13-14 (2002); Jennifer Y.
Buffaloe, “Special Needs” and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the
Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 536 (1997).
15. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991); Charles W. Chotvacs, The Fourth
Amendment Warrant Requirement: Constitutional Protection or Legal Fiction? Noted Exceptions
Recognized by the Tenth Circuit, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 331, 331 (September 2001/August 2002).
16. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325; Acton, 515 U.S. 646; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
17. See Frank, 369 U.S. 360; Camara, 387 U.S. 523; See, 387 U.S. 541; Burger, 482 U.S.
691; Tyler, 436 U.S. 499.
18. United States v. Marinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).
19. See generally Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
20. See Chotvacs, supra note 15, at 331.
21. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
22. 496 US 444 (1990).
23. Craig M. Bradley, The Court’s New Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 38 TRIAL 82,
82 (2002).
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with (legally) innocent civilians, but it refuse[d] to intervene in how police deal
with suspects when there is probable cause to arrest or search.”24
As this note will illustrate, the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in State
v. Mack does not entirely support Bradley’s proposition. In an effort to
produce a more definitive answer to the constitutional validity of the
checkpoint question, the United States Supreme Court decided Edmond,
providing courts with a “primary purpose” inquiry25 and the established
“Brown Balancing Test,”26 both of which will be discussed. The Missouri
Supreme Court could have applied these principles to determine the
reasonableness of the “ruse checkpoint” scheme it reviewed in Mack, but it
used other means to arrive at its decision. Therefore, roadblock jurisprudence
in the state of Missouri is still unsettled in many ways.
II. THE HISTORY OF ROADBLOCK AND CHECKPOINT JURISPRUDENCE— THE
SUPREME COURT RULES CERTAIN CHECKPOINTS CONSTITUTIONAL, OTHERS
NOT
A.

The Beginning: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte

In 1976, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. MartinezFuerte heard consolidated appeals from both the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit.27 The respondents were
appealing criminal prosecutions for offenses relating to the transportation of
illegal Mexican aliens across the border.28 The respondents involved in the
consolidated appeals from the Ninth Circuit were arrested at a permanent
checkpoint operated by the Border Patrol near the Mexican border.29 The

24. Id.
25. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-41 (2000).
26. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
27. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
28. Id. at 545. All of the checkpoint programs operated in a similar manner and were in a
fixed location near the Mexico-United States border. Id. Motorists were made aware of the
checkpoints by large flashing signs hanging over the highways. Id. at 545-46. All vehicles were
forced to stop at these checkpoints. Id. If, after the initial brief detention, the Border Patrol
Agent believed suspicious behavior was afoot, the motorist proceeded to a secondary inspection
area for further questioning. Id. at 546. The whole process generally took only a few minutes.
Id. at 546-47.
29. Id. at 545. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte was convicted after a jury trial on two
counts of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2). Id. at 548.
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia was also charged with two counts of illegally transporting an
alien and conspiring to commit that offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; however, unlike
Martinez-Fuerte, his motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the stop was granted. Id. at
548-549. Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Medrano-Barragan were both charged
with four counts of illegally transporting aliens, four counts of inducing the illegal entry of aliens
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(4), and one conspiracy count. Id. at 549. Like it did with
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Ninth Circuit held that without reasonable suspicion, these stops and
interrogations violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. It reversed
respondent Martinez-Fuerte’s conviction and affirmed the decisions in the
other cases.30 In a similar case involving the transportation of illegal aliens,
the Fifth Circuit decided differently than the Ninth Circuit and held that the
permanent checkpoints did not violate the Constitution.31 In an attempt to end
this circuit split, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the legality and constitutionality of the use of permanent checkpoint
stops to enforce Border Patrol.32
In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court held
consistently with the opinions set forth by the Fifth Circuit and found
checkpoint stops of a fixed and permanent nature that detain motorists for brief
questioning did not violate the Fourth Amendment and furthermore, that these
types of fixed checkpoints did not require a judicial warrant.33 The Court
arrived at this decision knowing that the checkpoint program authorized
enforcement officials to stop particular vehicles where no individual suspicion
of illegal aliens existed. However, the Court did make clear that the holding in
Martinez-Fuerte was narrow in scope and was limited only to the types of
permanent checkpoints designed with the sole purpose of enforcing Border
Patrol.34 The Court in Martinez-Fuerte justified its decision primarily on the
strong national sentiment favoring a limited flow of illegal aliens into the
country, and the Court recognized the accepted practice of limiting this flow by
way of permanent, temporary, and roving checkpoints set up by the Border
Patrol.35 The Court also found that the obvious and visible nature of the
Jiminez-Garcia, the District Court granted Guillen’s and Medrano-Barragan’s motion to suppress.
Id. Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the Government appealed the granting of the
motions to suppress in the decisions of Jiminez-Garcia and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan. Id.
30. Id. at 549.
31. Id. at 550. Petitioner Rodolfo Sifuentes was arrested at a permanent checkpoint near
Sarita, Texas for transporting illegal aliens. Id. at 549. His motion to suppress the evidence
derived from the stop was denied and he, like Martinez-Fuerte, was convicted after a jury trial.
Id. at 550. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction and found that these stops were
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Id.
32. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 550 n.6. The conflict between the circuits centered on
whether or not these checkpoints were in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Id. at 551. The Ninth Circuit found that they were, and the Fifth Circuit found that they were not.
Id. at 549, 550.
33. See id. at 549-50.
34. Id. at 567. The Court concluded, “[A]ny further detention . . . must be based on consent
or probable cause.” Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975)
(alteration in original)).
35. Id. at 552. “It has been national policy for many years to limit immigration into the
United States.” Id. at 551. The Court found that enforcing this limited flow into the country
poses difficult law enforcement problems. Id. at 552. At the time this decision was handed
down, despite Border Patrol’s efforts, the Court found illegal alien entry into the United States to
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checkpoints36 combined with the minimal intrusion on time provided drivers
with a warning and lessened the element of surprise for innocent travelers.37
The Court reasoned the minimal interference, the absence of surprise, and the
substantial government interest in retarding the influx of illegal immigration
substantiated its decision to allow the permanent Border Patrol checkpoints to
continue.38 The Court summarized:
[T]he purpose of the stops is legitimate and in the public interest, and the need
for this enforcement technique is demonstrated by the records in the cases
before us. Accordingly, we hold that the stops and questioning at issue may be
made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located
checkpoints.39

One reason Martinez-Fuerte made such an impact is that, although it had
limited application, it still established an exception to the rule that
individualized suspicion was a prerequisite for a seizure.40 The Court left no
doubt in its opinion that the checkpoint did constitute a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, yet it still found that the governmental
goals of the program and the negligible intrusion on the driver’s rights
outweighed the individual’s Constitutional concerns.41 The Martinez-Fuerte
decision paved the way for courts to carve out further exceptions to the general
rule of individualized suspicion in cases involving vehicle checkpoints.
B.

The Supreme Court Elaborates Further in Delaware v. Prouse and Brown
v. Texas

The Supreme Court decided two important intervening cases between the
time after the decision in Martinez-Fuerte and before the Court heard another
fundamental roadblock case, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.42
The Court in Delaware v. Prouse recognized that states do have a substantial
be a relatively easy task. Id. The Court thus reviewed techniques such as the permanent
checkpoint, the temporary checkpoint, and even the roving patrol as necessary in policing this
national dilemma. Id.
36. Id. at 565. The Court also used the visible manifestations of the checkpoint in
comparison with a judicial warrant to reach the conclusion that a warrant was not required to
operate these checkpoints. Id.
37. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-560. The Court explained: “Selective referral may
involve some annoyance, but it remains true that the stops should not be frightening or offensive
because of their public and relatively routine nature.” Id. at 560.
38. Id. at 558-561.
39. Id. at 562.
40. Id. at 561. The checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte only constituted a seizure. No search of
the vehicle was involved.
41. Id. The Court explained that an individual’s expectation of privacy in a vehicle is not as
great as it is in the individual’s dwelling where the standards of the Fourth Amendment are at a
heightened level. Id.
42. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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interest in protecting licensing and registration laws,43 however, it found that
interest was not substantial enough to justify roving patrol stops as an
enforcement technique.44 The Court concluded that stopping a car to check for
a license and registration when there was no reasonable suspicion to believe
that the driver was violating any specific law constituted an unreasonable
seizure.45 The Court found that “an individual operating or traveling in an
automobile [should] not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply
because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation[s]”
and laws.46 The Fourth Amendment protection that an individual is afforded in
a dwelling does not terminate when he leaves and enters a vehicle.47
The Prouse decision reiterated the notion that police officers must have a
reason based on objective facts before a stop is justified.48 According to the
Court, an individual motorist has a reasonable expectation of privacy not to be
subjected to arbitrary stops based on the unfettered “discretion of the [officers]
in the field.”49 The Court further concluded:
[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered,
or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for
violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to
check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.50

However, the Court did leave open the possibility that a state could create
“spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the
unconstrained exercise of discretion.”51 Hence, the use of checkpoints to
check every motorist’s license and registration according to a predetermined,
objective plan would be constitutionally valid.

43. 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979). In Prouse, the police stopped the respondent to check for a
valid driver’s license and registration. Id. at 650. When respondent’s car was stopped, the police
officer noticed marijuana in plain view on the car floor. Id. At the hearing for the respondent’s
motion to suppress the evidence, the patrolman who pulled the car over testified that he did not
observe any suspicious or unusual conduct by the driver beforehand. Id.
44. Id. at 658-659.
45. Id. at 663.
46. Id. at 662.
47. Id. at 662-63.
48. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The Court recognized that the most effective method of
enforcing traffic violations was “acting upon observed violations.” Id. at 659.
49. Id. at 655.
50. Id. at 663. Relying on the absence of empirical data in the case, the Court found that the
“contribution to highway safety made by discretionary stops selected from among drivers
generally will therefore be marginal at best.” Id. at 660.
51. Id. at 663.
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Brown v. Texas contributed to the roadblock analysis by providing a threepart balancing test that determined the reasonableness of seizures.52 In Brown,
the defendant was convicted of violating a Texas statute that made it a crime to
refuse to identify one’s self to a police officer who had requested such
information.53 When the officers detained Brown and asked for identification,
they performed “a seizure of his person,” and were thus governed by the same
Fourth Amendment principles as the roadblock cases.54 The Supreme Court
found that the Texas statute violated the Fourth Amendment because there was
no reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had been doing anything
criminal.55 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court used what is now known as
the “Brown Balancing Test,” where the constitutionality of a seizure turns
upon “a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure,
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of
the interference with individual liberty.”56 The “Brown Balancing Test”
enforced the notion that seizures must be based on specific facts “indicating
that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular
individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”57 The
Brown Court found no circumstances that should have led the police officer to
reasonably suspect the defendant was about to participate in criminal activity.58
Without objective facts and reasonable suspicion, an individual’s right to
privacy must take precedence over the goal of general crime prevention.59
C. A Variation on the Roadblock Cases: Michigan Department of State
Police v. Sitz
The status of roadblock jurisprudence remained fairly constant after the
Prouse decision until numerous motorists brought an action in 1990
challenging the constitutionality of a Michigan highway sobriety checkpoint

52. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
53. Id. at 49-50. In Brown, two police officers observed the defendant and another man
walking away from one another in an alley in an area that was known for high drug activity. Id.
at 48. The officers stopped the defendant and asked him to identify himself and tell the officers
what he was doing. Id. at 48-49. One officer testified that “the situation ‘looked suspicious and
we had never seen that subject in that area before.’” Id.
54. Id. at 50.
55. Id. at 52.
56. Id. at 50-51.
57. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
58. Id. at 51-52. The Court reasoned that there was no indication that it was unusual for
people to be in the alley where defendant was found. Id. at 52. Also, the mere fact that the
defendant was in an area of high crime does not automatically vilify him. Id.
59. Id. at 52.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

678

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:669

program.60 The District Court engaged in the balancing test created by Brown
v. Texas to make its original determination that this program violated the
Fourth Amendment.61 Using the balancing test, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the District Court’s findings that Michigan did have a serious interest in
curbing drinking and driving, that sobriety checkpoint programs are generally
ineffective, and that the intrusion on an individual’s privacy rights was
substantial.62 The legal issue that the Supreme Court faced in Sitz involved the
constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints generally.63 In the majority opinion
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the
Constitution does not prohibit a state’s use of highway sobriety checkpoints.64
The Court made this decision even though these sobriety checkpoints
functioned without the traditionally mandated individualized suspicion.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court decided that the lower courts had
misapplied the “Brown Balancing Test” in analyzing the reasonableness of the
sobriety checkpoints.65 Both courts found that the first prong of the test was
easily satisfied. Similar to the line of reasoning used in Martinez-Fuerte, the
Court relied heavily on the public policy justification for legalizing the
Michigan checkpoints. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “No one can seriously
dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in
eradicating it . . . . Conversely, the weight bearing on the other scale—the
measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints—
is slight.”66 The Court did not agree with the lower court’s interpretation of the
“effectiveness” prong. The Supreme Court looked to the empirical data to
justify the program, but also determined that this prong “was not meant to
transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to
60. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). According to the Michigan
guidelines, these sobriety checkpoints were set up at selected locations along various state roads.
Id. at 447. All vehicles passing through a checkpoint would then be stopped and the drivers
would be examined for signs of intoxication. Id. If an officer suspected a motorist was
intoxicated, he was directed out of the traffic flow for further questioning and further sobriety
tests. Id.
61. Id. at 448-49. “[T]he test involved ‘balancing the state’s interest in preventing accidents
caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the
level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy caused by the checkpoints.’” Id. (citing Sitz v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 439 (1988). The Court of Appeals agreed with the
District Court that “the Brown three-prong balancing test was the correct test to be used to
determine the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint plan.” Id. (citing Sitz, 170 Mich. App. at
439).
62. Id. at 449.
63. Id. at 450. The Court noted, “We address only the initial stop of each motorist passing
through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint
officers.” Id. at 450-51.
64. Id. at 447.
65. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
66. Id. at 451.
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which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be
employed to deal with a serious public danger.”67 Another point of
disagreement was the third and final prong of the “Brown Balancing Test.”
The Court agreed that the objective intrusion of the stops (only a few seconds)
was minimal, but it also held that the sobriety checkpoints were not unduly
burdensome on the “subjective intrusion” element of the test68 and did not rise
to the level of being a Fourth Amendment violation as the lower courts
contended.69 The Court reasoned that the motorist’s level of surprise or fear
should have been reduced by some degree after witnessing the visible
manifestations of the approaching checkpoint.70 Hence, the Court arrived at its
decision reversing the lower courts and concluding that the benefit to be gained
from these sobriety checkpoints in combating the state’s drunk-driving
problem outweighed the slight “subjective intrusion” on the motorist and did
not violate the motorists’ Fourth Amendment rights.71
D. The Missouri Supreme Court Offers a Pre-Edmond Opinion in State v.
Damask
The case of State v. Damask is especially notable because in it, the
Missouri Supreme Court created yet another exception to the Fourth
Amendment individualized suspicion rule by upholding the use of roadblocks
designed for the sole purpose of intercepting drug trafficking.72 The operation
of the Damask checkpoint was simplistic, yet extremely deceptive in

67. Id. at 453. The language from Brown v. Texas refers to the “effectiveness” aspect as “the
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest.” Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. In examining
the second prong of the “Brown Balancing Test,” the Sitz Court analyzed and compared the 1.5%
“hit rate” of the Michigan checkpoints to the 0.5% “hit rate” that was approved in MartinezFuerte. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454-55.
68. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452. The subjective intrusion element in Sitz referenced the fear and
surprise element of “law-abiding motorists” not “the natural fear of one who has been drinking.”
Id.
69. Id. at 455. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals, which had found the
level of “subjective intrusion” to be substantial, had misinterpreted previous cases concerning the
“degree of ‘subjective intrusion’ and the potential for generating fear and surprise.” Id. at 452.
The Court held in Martinez-Fuerte that unlike roving patrols, which operated at night and on
seldom-used roads, permanent checkpoints are less frightening to motorists. “At traffic
checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped . . . can see visible signs of
the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”
Id. at 452-53 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558). The Supreme Court in
Sitz found the level of intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint
indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops upheld in Martinez-Fuerte. Id. at 453.
70. Id. at 453.
71. Id. at 455.
72. 936 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). See also Scott A. White, The
Constitutionality of Drug Enforcement Checkpoints in Missouri, 63 MO. L. REV. 263 (1998).
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practice.73 The law enforcement technique used in Damask was a classic
illustration of a “ruse checkpoint.” Defendant Richard Damask fell victim to
this ruse checkpoint and was arrested after a drug-sniffing dog smelled
marijuana in Damask’s trunk.74 After the trial court sustained Damask’s
motion to suppress the evidence, the state then brought an interlocutory appeal,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the checkpoint operation violated
Damask’s Fourth Amendment rights.75
Much like the Sitz case, the critical legal issue facing the Missouri
Supreme Court in Damask was the constitutionality of the initial vehicle
seizure at the checkpoint.76 All parties conceded that the checkpoint stop was
a seizure and therefore, it must have operated according to the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment.77 As the Supreme Court did in the Sitz case,78 the
Damask majority relied heavily on the “Brown Balancing Test.”79 In applying
the first factor of the “Brown Balancing Test,” the Missouri Supreme Court
concluded that the prevention of drug trafficking was certainly a legitimate
governmental interest and that the severity of that interest could hardly be

73. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 568. The Franklin County Sheriff’s Department “placed two
signs that read ‘DRUG ENFORCEMENT CHECKPOINT 1 MILE AHEAD’ approximately onequarter mile west of exit 242, on both sides of the eastbound lanes of I-44.” Id. These
checkpoints attempted to put an end to drug trafficking along I-44, a popular drug transportation
route. Id. Exit 242 was a remote area and according to the State, there were few valid reasons for
non-local residents to take the exit. Id. “Contrary to the [highway’s postings,] the sheriff’s
[department] set up the checkpoint at the top of the eastbound exit 242 ramp.” Id. Eastbound
cars taking the 242 exit climbed the ramp, “came to [a] stop sign, and found a uniformed officer
waiting.” Id. The officer then approached the car, asked for a license and registration, and
inquired as to the reason for why the motorist exited the highway. Id. If the motorist’s answer
was reasonable, he was allowed to proceed. Id. If the answer was unreasonable, or if there was
reason to suspect drug trafficking, the officer then asked for permission to search the vehicle. Id.
If consent was not granted, a drug-sniffing dog circled the vehicle. Id.
74. Id. At about 4:20 a.m. on November 22, 1996, Damask’s Mercury Marquis bearing
Nevada license plates passed through the checkpoint. Upon being asked why he exited, Damask
answered that he was turning around to go back and get something to eat. However, officers
noticed fast food bags in the car and a warm cup of coffee. Damask did not grant the officers
consent to search the car, so the police dog performed an exterior “sniff” of the car. Inside
Damask’s trunk, officers found a bag containing marijuana. Id.
75. Id. at 568-69.
76. Id. at 570.
77. Id. at 570. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. “Generally, seizures that are not based upon a particularized suspicion of criminal
activity are [presumed to be] unreasonable.” Id. at 570-71.
78. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
79. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). “The reasonableness of a seizure that is less
intrusive than a traditional arrest depends on the balance between the public interest in preventing
criminal activity and the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary interference by law officers.”
Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 571.
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questioned.80 The Missouri Supreme Court looked to a prior Washington D.C.
case, Galberth v. United States,81 for assistance in applying the second prong
of the test. The Damask court ultimately rejected the Galbreth notion that
checkpoints such as the one in Martinez-Fuerte to control illegal immigration
are any different than the checkpoints set up to halt drug trafficking.82 The
court decided that the checkpoint in Damask passed the second prong of the
Brown test so long as the checkpoint was “substantially similar to prior
successful checkpoints.”83 Finally, the court also ruled that both the objective
and subjective intrusion on an individual’s rights was minimal and therefore
passed the third prong of the Brown balancing test.84 The objective test was
passed because the duration of the stops lasted for an average of two minutes.85
The checkpoint also survived the subjective test because the program was
governed by a clear, strict plan that removed all discretion from the officers
who ran it.86 Following the Brown analysis, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that the Damask checkpoints were not unreasonable and thus did not violate
the Fourth Amendment rights of Mr. Damask.87
E.

The United States Supreme Court Attempts to End the Roadblock
Ambiguity with City of Indianapolis v. Edmond

The operation of the vehicle checkpoint program in Indianapolis v.
Edmond, like most other of the roadblock programs, was relatively
straightforward.
At each checkpoint location, approximately thirty
Indianapolis police officers were present to stop a predetermined number of
80. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 571. The Damask court stated, “Drug trafficking has created a
‘veritable national crisis in law enforcement’ and is ‘one of the greatest problems affecting the
health and welfare of our population.’” Id. (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 538 (1985); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. VonRaab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)).
81. 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The defendant in Damask relied on Galbreth for the
proposition that a checkpoint set up for the primary purpose of drug interdiction, unlike sobriety
and immigration control, fails the second prong of the Brown test and is not considered a
sufficient public interest because it fails to “promote a government interest separate from that of
general law enforcement.” Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 572.
82. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 572-73.
83. Id. at 573. The court held:
[I]f the State can show generally that similar checkpoint operations effectively advanced
the State’s interests, and that the particular checkpoint in question was substantially
similar to prior successful checkpoints, this is sufficient evidence from which a reviewing
court can determine the effectiveness of checkpoint operations under Brown. Thus, if
similar checkpoints discover ‘problems [illegal drug trafficking] predictably associated
with persons stopped at roadblocks,’ Brown’s second prong is satisfied.
Id. at 573 (alteration in original).
84. Id. at 573-74.
85. Id. at 574.
86. Id. at 574-75.
87. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 575.
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vehicles.88 At least one officer approached each car after the driver was
stopped and advised the driver as to the purpose of the checkpoint.89 The
officers conducted each of these searches in the “same manner until
particularized suspicion develop[ed].”90 The individual police officers had no
discretion to vary the procedure or the sequence of the vehicles they stopped.91
In August 1998, the city of Indianapolis began to operate these checkpoints
on Indianapolis roadways with the primary purpose of reducing the amount of
unlawful drugs transported in motor vehicles.92 The city conducted six such
roadblocks between the months of August and November of that year, stopping
a total of 1,161 vehicles and arresting one hundred and four motorists.93 The
resulting figures totaled an overall “hit rate” of approximately nine percent.94
According to the affidavit of Indianapolis Police Sergeant Marshall
DePew, the locations of these checkpoints were selected weeks in advance and
took into account such factors as local area crime statistics and traffic
volume.95 The Indianapolis checkpoints were usually conducted in the
daylight hours and were identified with bold signs that stated, “NARCOTICS
CHECKPOINT MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED
TO STOP.”96

88. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000).
89. Id. The officer then proceeded to ask the driver for his or her driver’s license and vehicle
registration. Id. The officer was also on the lookout for any suspicious “signs of impairment,”
while conducting an “open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside.” Id. While the
officer was doing this, a drug-sniffing dog circled the outside of the vehicle. Id. Particularized
suspicion was established when the officers noticed any suspicious behavior or received any hints
from the trained drug-sniffing dog. Id.
90. Id. at 35.
91. Id. The city mandated that each seizure was to be conducted according to a standard
procedure and each search was to be performed either by consent or by the requisite amount of
suspicion. Id. The city agreed that absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause, each stop
would last less than five minutes. Id.
92. See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999).
93. Id. Of these one hundred and four arrests, fifty-five of them were for drug-related
crimes, and forty-nine of the arrests were for non-drug-related crimes. Id.
94. Id. Subsequent to the Edmond decision, the Missouri Supreme Court in Mack found this
nine percent “hit rate” inadequate to create the necessary level of individualized suspicion that
makes a seizure reasonable. “Whatever the average hit rate may be in Missouri ruse checkpoints,
it is clear that it is not sufficient to make them more than just another police technique; it is not
enough to elevate ruse checkpoints to the next level, so that the ruse itself creates the kind of
individualized suspicion required by Edmond.” State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 716 (Mo. 2002)
(en banc).
95. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
96. Id. at 35-36. Unlike Mack, the Indianapolis checkpoint was not a ruse and did not try to
trick motorists. The actual checkpoint was located exactly where the posted sign said it was. See
Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709.
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Respondents James Edmond and Joell Palmer were both stopped at the
Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint in late September 1998.97 Respondents
contended that such checkpoints violated their Fourth Amendment rights.98
The petitioners conceded that the primary purpose of the Indianapolis
checkpoint program was to disrupt the flow of illegal narcotics in the city.99
Using the primary purpose of the checkpoint as a decisive factor in its
decision, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]e have never approved a
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only
limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by
some measure of individualized suspicion.”100 The State attempted to persuade
the Court that the Indianapolis checkpoint had a valid secondary purpose of
checking licenses and registrations, yet the Court quickly dismissed the State’s
argument, recognizing the dangers that would accompany justifying
checkpoints based on so-called “secondary purposes.”101
Each of the previous checkpoint cases that had been approved by the Court
dealt primarily with issues such as policing the national border or ensuring
roadway safety, not general crime prevention.102 After the State’s attempt to
highlight the similarities between its facts and those found in Martinez-Fuerte
and Sitz, the Court found:
If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be little
check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any
conceivable law enforcement purpose. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment would do
little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American
life.103

97. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 36. Both “[r]espondents then filed a lawsuit on behalf of
themselves and the class of [] motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being
stopped . . . at the Indianapolis drug checkpoints.” Id.
98. Id. Respondents also contended that these checkpoints violated “the search and seizure
provision of the Indiana Constitution.” Id.
99. Id. at 40-41. “In their stipulation of facts, the parties repeatedly refer to the checkpoints
as ‘drug checkpoints’ and describe them as ‘being operated by the City of Indianapolis in an
effort to interdict unlawful drugs in Indianapolis.’” Id.
100. Id. at 41.
101. Id. at 46. This is known as the “mixed-motive” argument. If the Court had given
credence to this argument, the door would be left open for any conceivable type of checkpoint so
long as there was a legitimate purpose attached. Id.
102. Of course, the State in Edmond put forth arguments attempting to compare its facts with
those in both Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz. The State argued that all three cases had designs to
“arrest[] those suspected of committing crimes.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. The State also
compared the severity of the drug problem to that of drunken-driving in Sitz and to that of illegal
immigration in Martinez-Fuerte. The Court ultimately disposed of all of the State’s contentions.
Id.
103. Id. at 42.
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The Court continued that, “when law enforcement authorities pursue primarily
general crime control purposes at checkpoints such as here, however, stops can
only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.”104 The Court
further provided that it would not “sanction stops justified only by the
generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may
reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.”105
After a detailed tour of the historical checkpoint jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the Indianapolis checkpoints, unlike those
approved of in the past, violated the Fourth Amendment because their purpose
was “indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.”106 The
Court was clear, however, that its decision did not change the Martinez-Fuerte
or Sitz holdings in any way, but that any checkpoints with general crime
control goals must still operate under the governing principles of the Fourth
Amendment’s required amounts of individualized suspicion.107
F.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms the U.S. Supreme Court with
a Slight Variation on Edmond

In a case filed on October 7, 2002,108 the Eigth Circuit Court of Appeals
entered its own decision on the ruse checkpoint issue in United States v.
Yousif.109 The facts of the Yousif case were almost identical to those of both
Damask and State v. Mack.110 The location of the Yousif checkpoint was
chosen because of police suspicion that Interstate 44 was being used to
transport large volumes of narcotics. The “Sugar Tree” checkpoint location
was also selected because it was a little-used route for commercial or local
traffic.111 The operation of the Sugar Tree checkpoint ran according to
standards issued by the Missouri Highway Patrol.112 The checkpoint system,
except for its deceptive nature, operated almost identically to the checkpoint in

104. Id. at 47.
105. Id. at 44.
106. Id. at 48.
107. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
108. Note that this decision came out after Mack. This case is offered here to provide support
to the thesis that ruse checkpoints should be abolished altogether.
109. 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002)
110. In Yousif, the Phelps County Sheriff’s Department set up a ruse checkpoint at the end of
the exit ramp leading uphill from eastbound Interstate 44 to Sugar Tree Road in Phelps County,
Missouri. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 823. The checkpoint was classified as a ruse checkpoint because
signs were visible along the highway, alerting motorists to an approaching drug checkpoint,
whereas in reality, the checkpoint was located on the ramp that exited the highway a short
distance past the warning signs. Id. at 823.
111. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 823. The location of the ruse checkpoint was chosen for almost the
exact same reasons. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 707.
112. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 823.
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Indianapolis v. Edmond.113 On April 13, 2000, Salwan Yousif drove his rented
Ford Explorer into the Sugar Tree Road checkpoint.114 After a Missouri
Highway Patrolman picked up on a very strong berry-like odor, he asked
Yousif and his wife for consent to search the Ford Explorer.115 The search
produced large amounts of marijuana.116
The district court denied Yousif’s motion to suppress the evidence and
adopted the magistrate judge’s decision, which concluded that the Sugar Tree
Road checkpoint did not violate Yousif’s Fourth Amendment rights, and that
Yousif’s consent to the search was voluntary.117 However, shortly after the
district court made its decision, the United States Supreme Court handed down
its landmark decision in Edmond, which held that similar drug interdiction
roadside checkpoints were violative of an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights because they allowed seizures without the requisite amount of
individualized suspicion.118
Even after learning of the Edmond decision, the magistrate judge again
denied Yousif’s motion to suppress.119 Though the magistrate judge believed
there was enough individualized suspicion to distinguish the case from
Edmond, the district court disagreed, and held the Sugar Tree Road checkpoint
to be “‘clearly illegal’ under Edmond.”120 The district court continued, “[a]ll
of these indicators . . . Defendant’s initial hesitation . . . nervousness and
shaking . . . and the overwhelming berry-scented air freshener, would not exist

113. “When a vehicle would arrive at the [Sugar Tree Road] checkpoint, at least one
uniformed officer would approach the driver and ask for his or her driver’s license, registration,
and—if required by the state of registration—proof of insurance. The officer would also record
the license plate number” and would inquire as to why the motorist exited the highway. Id. at
823-24. If the officer had suspicions about the driver, the officer would ask for consent to search
the vehicle. Id. at 824. If consent was denied and reasonable suspicion continued, the officer
would ask the driver and any other occupants to get out of the vehicle while a drug dog circled the
vehicle. Id.
114. Id. at 824.
115. Id. The Ford Explorer had Oklahoma plates, and when questioned by the police, Yousif
produced an Arizona driver’s license and a rental agreement for the vehicle. Id.
116. Id.
117. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 825.
118. Id. See also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
119. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 825. The magistrate judge held this case to be distinguishable from
Edmond, finding that the police did have the requisite degree of individualized suspicion to make
the search. Id. The magistrate judge pointed to Yousif’s conduct in approaching the checkpoint
to illustrate the basis for the suspicion. Id. According to the judge, factors such as exiting the
highway in the first place, stopping his vehicle half-way up the ramp, and driving a vehicle with
out-of-town plates all indicated that Yousif might have been attempting to avoid this checkpoint.
Id. at 825-26.
120. Id. at 826. The district court held that “the Supreme Court’s holding in Edmond could
not be ‘avoided’ simply by relying on ‘factual indicators’ which purportedly established
individualized reasonable suspicion that Yousif was transporting drugs.” Id.
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but for the illegal checkpoint.”121 The district court agreed with the
magistrate’s opinion that Yousif’s voluntary consent was an independent basis
for denying the motion to suppress.122
On appeal, Yousif argued that the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress by contending:
[T]he apparent consent he gave . . . and his apparent waiver of Miranda
rights . . . were not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful seizure to purge
the taint of the constitutional violation.
Therefore . . . the marijuana
discovered . . . [was] fruit[] of the poisonous tree and subject to exclusion.123

For the same reasons that the Supreme Court found the Indianapolis
checkpoints unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found
the Sugar Tree Road ruse checkpoint unconstitutional. Like the checkpoint in
Edmond, the primary purpose of the Sugar Tree Road checkpoint was the
interdiction of drug trafficking.124 Using the same reasoning that was used by
the dissent in Mack, the Court of Appeals stated, “while some drivers may
have wanted to avoid being caught for drug trafficking, many more took the
exit for wholly innocent reasons—such as wanting to avoid the inconvenience
and delay.”125 Borrowing from the majority’s logic in Edmond, the Court of
Appeals continued, “a quantum of individualized suspicion only after a stop
occurs cannot justify the stop itself.”126 The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the district court, declared that the Sugar Tree checkpoint
unconstitutional, and remanded the case for further proceedings.127
III. WHAT ALL THE FUSS IS ABOUT: THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT THROWS
A CURVEBALL IN STATE V. MACK
On February 13, 2002, the Supreme Court of Missouri reached what many
would consider a surprising decision when it reversed the trial court’s decision
to suppress evidence confiscated by police while operating a ruse checkpoint.
The court faced essentially the same Fourth Amendment issues that the United
States Supreme Court faced in Edmond.128 The underlying facts of Mack are
the same as those that courts have seen numerous times before in the so-called
“ruse checkpoint” cases.129

121. Id.
122. Id. at 826-27.
123. Id. at 827.
124. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 827.
125. Id. at 827-28.
126. Id. at 828 (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 832.
128. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
129. See Yousif, 308 F.3d at 824; United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2000); Bass
v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 921 (Va. 2000); State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1997).
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On June 24, 1999, the City of Troy Police Department established a drug
checkpoint on northbound Highway 61 at the Old Cap Au Gris exit in Lincoln
County, Missouri.130 The Old Cap Au Gris exit had no gas stations or
restaurants, and the police believed that the only conceivable reasons for a
traveler to take this exit “would be to go to a local high school, a local Catholic
church, or one of several residences in the area.”131 The drug checkpoint
consisted of a sign posted on the highway approximately one quarter of a mile
from the Old Cap Au Gris exit, which read “DRUG ENFORCEMENT
CHECKPOINT ONE MILE AHEAD” and “POLICE DRUG DOGS
WORKING.”132 This checkpoint was a ploy because it led drivers to believe
that the drug checkpoint was located at the Highway 47 exit further down the
road, when in reality the checkpoint was located at the Old Cap Au Gris exit.
Believing the checkpoint was at the Highway 47 exit, unsuspecting motorists
would exit at Old Cap Au Gris and drive right into the police trap.133
The Troy police conducted their checkpoints according to guidelines that
were similar to those established by the Indianapolis Police Department in
Edmond.134 The police were instructed that motorists had no valid reason to
take the Old Cap Au Gris exit on the night in question. If police questioning
revealed no circumstances that warranted reasonable suspicion of drug
trafficking, the motorist was released.135 If the officers did have reasonable
suspicion that the motorists possessed narcotics, they directed the vehicle to
the entrance side of the ramp, where one of the officers sought permission to
search the car.136
Respondent Mack took the Old Cap Au Gris exit at approximately 11:00
p.m. on June 24 and was stopped by the Troy police officers.137 At the
suppression hearing, one of the officers described his first contact with Mack
as “the most obvious veering off of 61 all night. The vehicle . . . almost missed
the turn. He was going northbound on 61 and all of a suddenly [sic] veered off

130. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 707. The Missouri Supreme Court noted that the police chose this
particular exit because they believed there was no legitimate reason for a motorist to take that
particular exit on that particular night. Id.
131. Id. The police determined that there were no activities that Thursday night at the high
school or the church, and therefore, believed the exit to be an ideal location to set up their
checkpoint. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The Troy police were stationed at the top of the ramp and were instructed to stop all
exiting vehicles, record the driver’s license number and registration, and ascertain the motorists’
reason for exiting. Id.
135. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 707.
136. Id. If the driver did not grant the officers permission, a drug dog was used to detect the
presence of any narcotics. Id.
137. Id.
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onto the off ramp.”138 The officer continued in more detail by testifying, “I
remember seeing a vehicle coming toward me which would have been
northbound 61. It appeared it was going to continue past the off ramp. And
suddenly it shot over and almost missing it came up the off ramp. And he was
moving at a pretty good pace too.”139
Mack told officers that he had exited at Old Cap Au Gris to get to a bar in
Troy.140 Once at the checkpoint, the officers observed that Mack was “very
nervous, had glazed and bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.”141 Mack
allowed the police to search his car, and they discovered various illegal
narcotics under the driver’s seat. Mack was charged with possession of
methamphetamine, cocaine, and methylphenidate.142
A.

The Missouri Supreme Court distinguishes Mack from Edmond

The Respondent in Mack presented the obvious argument that Edmond
controlled the case, and that his motion to suppress should have been granted
accordingly.143 The State of Missouri, on the other hand, contended that the
checkpoints involved were “fundamentally different” than those set up in
Indianapolis.144 The State argued that the requisite level of “individualized
suspicion” necessary to allow a checkpoint to pass constitutional muster was
present.145 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with the State, found that
Mack was distinguishable from Edmond, and concluded that the checkpoints
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.146 The decision in Mack thus
turned on the same legal issue as Edmond— whether or not the checkpoints in
question generated the “necessary quantum of individualized suspicion” to
make them reasonable and thus, constitutional.147 The Mack majority
recognized that a police officer normally must observe some type of unusual

138. Id.
139. Id. at 707.
140. Mack, 665.W.3d at 707. The dissent determined that a motorist could have used this exit
to get to the bar to which Mack was headed. Id. at 718 (Stith, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 708.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 709.
145. Mack, 66 S.W.3d. at 709.
146. Id. at 709-10. The court in Mack recounted the facts in Edmond. There, a predetermined
number of cars at each checkpoint were stopped at random and there was no attempt to aquire
individualized suspicion before making any of the stops. Id. at 709. The majority in Mack
reasoned that, unlike in Edmond, the entire purpose of the Mack checkpoint was to “generate the
suspicious conduct necessary to constitute ‘individualized suspicion,’ and this was done by
deceiving drivers who were engaged in criminal activity into exiting the highway so as to avoid
the checkpoint they expected to encounter at the next exit.” Id.
147. Id. at 709.
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conduct, “which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot,” before justifying this type of seizure.148
The majority opinion in Mack found it was logical that drivers with
something to hide, such as drugs in the car, would avoid the drug checkpoint at
all costs and exit at the nearest available off-ramp.149 The majority also relied
on the fact that there was allegedly no other legitimate reason for motorists to
take the Old Cap Au Gris exit on the night police operated the checkpoints.150
The court also accepted the State’s contention that these types of ruse
checkpoints have a lofty success rate because most drivers with drugs in their
cars usually “take the bait.”151 Without explicitly applying the “Brown
Balancing Test,” the majority also analyzed the second effectiveness prong of
the test by recognizing that these checkpoints were set up in an identical
manner to those that have been found to be successful in the past.152
The final, and possibly the most convincing, reason behind the majority’s
ruling was Mack’s conduct in taking the Old Cap Au Gris exit.153 According
to one officer’s testimony, Mack “suddenly veered off onto the off ramp” and
“almost missed the turn,” leading the officer little choice but to infer that Mack
had made a last-ditch effort to avoid the drug checkpoint.154 The majority held
that this particular conduct, coupled with the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the checkpoint’s premise, certainly constituted the requisite
amount of “individualized suspicion” necessary to be classified as
“reasonable.”155 This particularized conduct formed the basis of the majority’s
refutation of the dissent’s argument that this case is indistinguishable from
United States v. Green,156 where that court held that checkpoints similar to the
ones in Mack constituted an unreasonable seizure.157

148. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
149. Id. at 709. The nearest available off-ramp in Mack was the Old Cap Au Gris exit, and
hence an effective trap was laid. Id. at 707.
150. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 707. The majority wrote, “the checkpoint was set up in an isolated
and sparsely populated area offering no services to motorists and was conducted on an evening
that would otherwise have little traffic.” Id. The court also added that the defendant took the exit
at 11:00 p.m., a time when there is normally even less traffic on the local roads. Id.
151. Id. at 709.
152. Id. (citing State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 573 (Mo. 1997)). Damask referenced the
success rate of this police tactic as part of the rationale for its legitimacy. Id.
153. Id. at 709-10. See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275-77 (2002). The Mack
majority relied on the reasoning in Arvizu when it took into consideration Mack’s conduct in
exiting the highway. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709-10. The Court in Arvizu found that courts must
look to the “the totality of the circumstances.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273.
154. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 710.
155. Id. at 710.
156. 275 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2001).
157. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 710 (citing United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2001)).
The majority in Mack found the case to be distinguishable from Green because in Green, there
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The Mack Dissent Stays True to Edmond

The Court in Edmond realized and appreciated the danger and severity of
drugs and drug-related activity in this country; however, it went on to find that,
“the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning
what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given
purpose.”158 The Mack dissent agreed and cited numerous cases decided both
before and after Edmond declaring these ruse checkpoints unconstitutional.159
The dissent began by comparing the facts in Mack with those in some of
the pre-Edmond decisions. Two cases in particular, State v. Damask and
Galberth v. United States, factored largely in the dissent’s reasoning. The
dissent stressed that the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Damask, which
approved the use of checkpoints such as the one in Mack for the purpose of
preventing drug-related crimes, was in direct conflict with Edmond.160 In
Damask, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the Galberth reasoning and
equated the approval of border checkpoints with an approval of roadway
checkpoints for the principal purpose of deterring general criminal activity.161
However, the dissent urged that the Galberth outcome should be the rule
because it was consistent with Edmond, holding ruse checkpoints to be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.162 The Missouri Supreme Court
in Damask even held, “[b]ut for the illegal immigration cases, one might agree
that Galberth correctly states the law.”163
The dissent referenced the recent Eighth Circuit decision in United States
v. Green, which explicitly held that a ruse checkpoint similar to the one used in
Mack violated the Fourth Amendment guidelines stressed in Edmond.164 The

was no additional evidence of the requisite individualized suspicion, whereas in Mack, Mack
almost missed the turn and veered suddenly off the highway. Id. at 710.
158. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
159. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 711-12 (Stith, J., dissenting). The dissent cited cases invalidating
general criminal checkpoints, such as People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), and
pre-Edmond cases with similar holdings, United States v. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d 149 (10th
Cir. 1992); Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
160. Mack, 66 S.W. 3d at 712 (Stith, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that “in Damask this
Court considered the reasoning of Galberth, . . . that police may not use a checkpoint to seek
evidence of drug-related crimes, but rejected that reasoning because it believed . . . that the
United States Supreme Court’s approval of border patrol checkpoints in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte constituted approval of roadway checkpoints for the purpose of deterring
criminal activity.” Id.
161. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court did not rule according to the Galberth decision, which
held that police could not use such suspicionless checkpoints. Id.
162. Id.
163. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 572 (Mo. 1997).
164. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 712-13 (Stith, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Green, 275 F.3d
694, 697-700 (8th Cir. 2001)). The checkpoint program in Green operated under the same ruse
premise as the one in Mack. Id. at 712. In Green, one defendant consented to a search of his car
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Green court ruled in conformity with the Edmond holding and found that
checkpoints used for general crime prevention were not constitutional.165 The
Mack dissent also relied on an earlier case, which actually foreshadowed some
of the reasoning that the Supreme Court would later apply in Edmond. United
States v. Huguenin also involved a checkpoint warning similar to the one found
in Mack, which notified drivers of a drug/DUI checkpoint at an approaching
exit.166 The Huguenin court reasoned,
[The police] did not attempt to minimize the fear and surprise potentially
experienced by motorists, but specifically attempted to increase surprise. An
ordinary law-abiding citizen, who perhaps took the exit simply to avoid the
unusual process of being stopped on an Interstate highway, could fear that he
would be under greater suspicion and subject to more intrusive questions and a
thorough search of his car simply because he had chosen to take the exit.167

The Mack dissent suggested that the ruse checkpoint used in Huguenin “caused
greater Fourth Amendment concern because its surreptitious nature resulted in
unreasonable and unnecessary surprise on the part of law-abiding
motorists.”168 After discussing both the constitutionality of the mixed-motive
purpose of the checkpoint 169 and its excessive level of subjective intrusion, the

at a drug enforcement checkpoint. Drugs were found in the car. Defendants brought a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the admission of evidence resulting from the stop and subsequent search
of the car at the drug checkpoint. Green, 275 F.3d at 697-98.
165. Green, 275 F.3d at 699-700.
166. United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 549 (6th Cir. 1998). The Tennessee Sheriff’s
Department had established this checkpoint as a ruse to stop motorists who chose to exit off the
highway after viewing the warning signs. Although the two signs posted on eastbound I-40 read
“DRUG-DUI ENFORCEMENT CHECK POINT 1/2 MILE AHEAD,” the officers had no
checkpoint in place on the highway at that location. Id. Rather, the police set up a checkpoint at
the end of the Airport Road exit ramp, which was the first exit available to motorists after the
posted signs. Id. The Airport Road exit was not frequently used because no services were
offered at the exit. Id. Motorists were unaware of the roadblock at the end of the ramp until they
came around a curve approximately 50 to 100 yards into exit ramp. Id. After a motorist exited,
there was no way to avoid the checkpoint because it was illegal to back down the ramp. Id.
167. Id. at 561.
168. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 711 (Stith, J., dissenting).
169. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 556-59. There was a dispute about whether the checkpoint’s
primary purpose was to prevent drunken driving or to intercept narcotics. After analyzing the
Whren and Merrett decisions as well as other mixed-motive cases, the court ultimately held that
the primary purpose of the program was to detect narcotics and that the checkpoint could not be
ruled constitutional simply because another purpose was to detect drunken driving. Id. at 559.
The court found that “[t]he problem with mixed-motive checkpoints is that they allow law
enforcement officers the opportunity to use a pretext to question and search for contraband
without probable cause, conduct the Supreme Court consistently has frowned upon.” Id. at 557.
For a discussion on mixed-motive purposes and pretextual stops, see Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 816 (1996) and Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1995).
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Huguenin court concluded that the ruse checkpoints were not reasonable and
thus not constitutional.170
Another area of disagreement between the majority and the dissent in
Mack surrounded the police officers’ subjective good faith.171 The dissent
again pointed to Edmond, in which the Court found that setting up a trap so as
to avoid inconvenience was irrelevant and could “play no role in ordinary,
Not withstanding the
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”172
previously Court-approved exceptions, a checkpoint must always create the
requisite amount of individualized suspicion, to be determined by objective
means, rather than by the police officers’ subjective explanations.173 The
dissent continued, “our inquiry is not whether the police subjectively tried to
create a basis for individualized suspicion . . . [r]ather, the inquiry is whether
the way the drug checkpoint was in fact set up, considered objectively, created
the kind of individualized suspicion required by Edmond.”174 The dissent
found it paradoxical that a checkpoint scheme such as the one in Mack could
create individualized suspicion when every vehicle that took the Old Cap Au
Gris exit was stopped.175 The record revealed that between sixty and one
hundred and fifty vehicles exited during the life span of this checkpoint.176
According to the majority’s reasoning, every one of these vehicles met the
required “individualized suspicion” standard simply because they exited the
highway.177 The dissent suggested that this was “group suspicion” disguised
as individualized suspicion, and was unconstitutional.178
The dissent also refuted the majority’s conclusion that the effectiveness of
the ruse checkpoint somehow led to its “propriety.”179 The dissent cited Sitz,
where that Court held that the effectiveness of a certain law enforcement tactic
was not entirely determinative of a checkpoint’s constitutionality.180 The Sitz

170. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 563.
171. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 714 (Stith, J., dissenting). The majority adopted the idea that the
police tried to set up the checkpoint in a manner that would cause the least amount of
inconvenience for local residents and those who might have had a non-criminal reason for exiting
the highway. Id.
172. Id. (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000)).
173. Id.
174. Id. (emphasis in original).
175. Id.
176. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 714 (Stith, J., dissenting).
177. Id. The dissent further noted, “[t]his type of suspicion is hardly ‘individualized.’ If the
Court approves this procedure today, it, in effect, will have approved ‘group suspicion’ as a basis
for stopping each individual in the group.” Id.
178. Id. at 714-15.
179. Id. at 715.
180. Id. (citing Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990)). In Mack,
the dissent stated “that courts must not consider the relative effectiveness of a chosen path of law
enforcement activity in determining its constitutional propriety. So long as the technique
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Court did analyze the statistics of the Michigan checkpoint program as part of
the “Brown Balancing Test,” but it did not conclude that the statistics were so
overwhelming so as to elevate the checkpoint into a higher level of police
enforcement tactic that the Mack majority suggested.181 The Mack majority
suggested that ruse checkpoints are so effective that they belong to a
heightened category of police tactic because the checkpoints themselves
created the required individualized suspicion.182 The dissent looked to the
record in Mack to show that this proposition was not true.183 Although the
record was inconclusive regarding the exact numbers (the dissent found that
the inexactness of the record-keeping was yet another problem with these
checkpoints), the police testified that approximately five of the sixty to one
hundred and fifty cars that took the Old Cap Au Gris exit lead to a drug-related
arrest.184 In the cases of Edmond and Damask, which used similar types of
checkpoints,185 the “hit rate” was approximately nine percent and 1.5%
respectively.186 These relatively low percentages discredit the State’s
contention that these checkpoints, especially ruse checkpoints, are so much
more effective than regular, everyday police techniques.187
Perhaps the most practical and common sense-based arguments the dissent
presented were the various, non-criminal reasons why motorists might have
taken the “rigged” exit. Contrary to what the majority accepted, the dissent
found legitimate reasons why motorists might have taken the Old Cap Au Gris
exit. The dissent suggested reasons such as the following: a law-abiding
motorist could have wanted to get home or to another place of destination
without the hassle of a drug check, motorists might not have wanted to change
travel plans, or motorists might have had a general fear of the police.188 A
motorist not from the area, which was a small community, or a motorist of a

employed is reasonable, the decision whether to use it or some other approach, whether more or
less effective, is left in the hands of law enforcement officials.” Id.
181. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
182. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 715 (Stith, J., dissenting).
183. Id. The dissent refuted this notion when it found, “[n]either the record, nor common
human experience . . . supports the principal opinion’s assumption that only those engaged in
criminal activity would ‘take the bait’ and exit the highway at Old Cap Au Gris in response to the
subterfuge the police employed here.” Id. at 715.
184. Id. at 715 n.3.
185. The Edmond checkpoint, however, was not a ruse.
186. In Edmond, 1,161 vehicles were stopped and one hundred and four arrests were made,
fifty-five of which were drug-related. In Damask, approximately sixty-six cars drove into the
checkpoint, ten of which were searched. Only one arrest was made in that case, and that was of
the defendant. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 716 (Stith, J., dissenting) (citing City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000)); State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1996).
187. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 716. The dissent noted that the Supreme Court held in Edmond that
a nine percent overall success rate was not enough to create individualized suspicion. Id.
188. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

694

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:669

minority ethnic background might have been afraid of becoming a target of
harassment in such a system.189 The record went on to show that there were
numerous residences near the exit, and that the road to which the exit led could
have been used to get to downtown Troy.190 The dissent determined that the
road near the exit might not have been the most direct route to Troy, but
depending on traffic, it might have been just as timely as the other routes.191
Defendant Mack was not the only individual who might have had noncriminal reasons for taking this exit.192 On a few past occasions, the Old Cap
Au Gris exit became so backlogged because of the checkpoint program that
cars began to back up into the travel lanes of the highway.193 To remedy the
jam, police would waive many vehicles through without even so much as
taking “a glance” at them.194 The officer in charge provided only an estimate,
but he guessed that about forty-six of approximately eighty total vehicles were
approached by a police officer.195 After examining the inexactness of the
Mack system, it tends to look more like the random scheme that was
disfavored in Edmond rather than a system that adhered to strict, objective,
state-mandated guidelines.196 The dissent contended that because the Court
ruled group searches unconstitutional in Edmond, the Missouri Supreme Court
was obliged to do the same. The dissent also pointed out that if the police
really believed that every vehicle that took the exit had drugs within it, they
would not have waived all those cars through without even giving them a
preliminary glance.197
One final and key argument made by the dissent was that defendant
Mack’s swerving conduct in his car did not lead to his stop as the majority
contended. The record was clear that his car was stopped because he exited,
not because he swerved.198 Nowhere did the police state that they stopped him

189. Id. at 716-17.
190. Id. at 718.
191. Id. The defendant Mack testified that he was on his way to a bar located in Troy and that
is why he exited. The police officer confirmed that this would have been an acceptable route to
get from Mack’s house to the bar. Id.
192. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 719 (Stith, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 719 n.7.
196. Id. In Edmond, the police stopped and talked with drivers of a group of cars on the
highway, while letting others go by with no detention. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 35-36 (2000).
197. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 719 (Stith, J., dissenting). The dissent found, “the fact that police
were willing to send those cars on their way is a strong indicator that the police did not really
form an individualized suspicion of criminal activity from the mere fact that the cars exited at Old
Cap Au Gris.” Id.
198. Id. at 720.
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because of his conduct.199 Accordingly, this was an “after-the fact” argument
put forward to justify the stop.200 The dissent did acknowledge that according
to Brugal, the police are entitled to consider the “totality of the
circumstances.”201 Factors such as the vehicle’s swerving and the open
container of alcohol in the vehicle, when considered with the circumstances
surrounding the checkpoint, can be used in deciding whether there was enough
of the required suspicion to detain the defendant further.202 The dissent
emphasized however, that the issue to be decided was the constitutionality of
the initial stop.203
IV. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS: USING EDMOND-PRECEDENT, RUSE CHECKPOINTS
SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
As evidenced by the lengthy and somewhat inconsistent chain of court
decisions on the issue of police use of vehicle checkpoints, there does not seem
to be a definitive, ready-made answer to the question of the constitutionality of
these checkpoints. Even the Edmond decision, which was intended to provide
that so-called easy answer, was marked with a sharp disagreement between the
majority and dissenting opinions.204 After analyzing both opinions in Edmond,
it is still unclear which test should be applied in determining the
constitutionality of certain vehicle checkpoint cases.205 Both the “primary
purpose test” and the “Brown Balancing Test” have been approved by the
Court in the past, and yet, as seen in Edmond, both tests can yield differing
results. The fine line between those cases in which vehicle checkpoints are a
legitimate means of remedying a social ill and do not infringe upon the
constitutional rights of the motorist and those cases that do infringe on a
motorist’s Fourth Amendment rights is often difficult to locate. However,
considering the ambiguity that courts now have to deal with in deciding
199. Id. “[T]he state did introduce evidence of this swerving at trial, but the issue is not
whether the state recognized at trial that it needed an alternative ground for the stop to support the
stop but whether the police actually had an alternative ground at the time Mr. Mack was seized by
them . . . . They did not.” Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 720 n.8. (Stith, J., dissenting).
202. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 720 n.8.
203. Id.
204. This note will analyze the Mack decision as if it had been decided using either the
primary purpose test that the Edmond majority used, or the “Brown Balancing Test” that the
Edmond dissent used. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Edmond Court and was
joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed
the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia. Justice Thomas also
filed a separate dissenting opinion. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 33 (2000).
205. The majority opinion analyzed the Indianapolis vehicle checkpoint according to its
primary purpose. Id. at 41-42. The dissenting opinion applied the “Brown Balancing Test” to the
checkpoints in order to determine their constitutionality. Id. at 49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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vehicle checkpoint cases, especially those of the ruse variation, the Missouri
Supreme Court should have made a different finding than it did in Mack. The
majority opinion does not do justice to the long-established history of
roadblock jurisprudence that was developed to aid future court decisions such
as the one in Mack. The discussion of the Edmond principles is rather cursory,
and the long-approved “Brown Balancing Test” is ignored altogether.
This note does not suggest that the vehicle checkpoints in Mack were
identical to those in Edmond. It would be unfair to maintain that the Missouri
Supreme Court had no choice but to follow Edmond. A case could be made,
and in fact was made by the majority, that the two cases were distinguishable.
However, the Missouri Supreme Court certainly could have applied the dual
Edmond tests to this “distinguishable” ruse checkpoint case. If it had done so,
the outcome in Mack would have been the same as that in Edmond. Starting
with the rationale that the United States Supreme Court used in the Edmond
majority opinion, it should have been evident that the Mack checkpoint was
established to help eradicate the same societal problem for which the Edmond
checkpoint was established. The checkpoint in Mack was not developed to
serve any of the previously Court-approved purposes where the general rule of
individualized suspicion is suspended, such as retarding the influx of illegal
immigration,206 reducing the number of drunk drivers,207 serving
administrative purposes,208 or even the potentially appropriate purpose of
examining driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations.209 The Mack checkpoint,
like the Edmond checkpoint, was established with the aim of preventing
general criminal wrongdoings. The State in Mack does not even attempt to use
the “secondary purpose” argument that the State did in Edmond. The
petitioners in Edmond tried to convince the Court that the checkpoint was
justified because it had a legitimate, dual purpose of checking licenses and
registrations.210 The Court in Edmond immediately recognized the problems
that would come with approval of “secondary purposes” for legitimizing a
checkpoint. If the Court had accepted the petitioner’s argument, any
imaginable type of checkpoint would be allowed if it had a legitimate purpose
attached.211 The State in Mack did not even attempt to mask the primary
purpose of its checkpoint, which was to reduce the amount of drug trafficking
on Missouri highways.212

206. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
207. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
208. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
209. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353,
357 (4th Cir. 2000).
210. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 53 U.S. 32, 40-41 (2000).
211. Id. at 42.
212. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002).
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The State of Missouri argued that its checkpoints were fundamentally
different than those in Edmond because the required level of individualized
suspicion was present, whereas in Edmond it was not.213 The State elaborated
that the purpose of the Missouri checkpoints was to generate suspicion by
deceiving drivers engaged in criminal activity to exit the highway.214 This ruse
however, still does not mask the primary purpose of the entire program, which
was to interdict the transportation of drugs. Even assuming that the trick did
generate the appropriate level of individualized suspicion, this Missouri
checkpoint system still serves unconstitutional purposes. The Missouri
Supreme Court should have decided, as did the majority in Edmond, that
“because the primary purpose . . . is ultimately indistinguishable from the
general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate[d] the Fourth
Amendment.”215
Not only is the primary purpose test easily deciphered in Mack, the State’s
premise that the checkpoint’s entire reason for being was to generate suspicion
is also flawed. Judge Stith’s dissent highlighted an abundance of non-criminal
reasons for avoiding the checkpoint. In examining the results of a similar
South Carolina variation216 of the Missouri ruse checkpoint, designed to check
driver’s licenses and registrations, the Brugal court found that one driver
exited because he “was nervous about not having a driver’s license.”217 Two
other drivers exited simply because they were lost.218 There are a number of
ways for an unsuspecting motorist to inadvertently find himself in the teeth of
one of these ruse checkpoints. Courts have almost always discovered that no
matter how remote the selected location for the ruse checkpoint is, an innocent
motorist can somehow end up in it.219 The dissent in Mack acknowledged that
it was feasible for Mack to get to his Troy bar destination by taking the Old
Cap Au Gris exit.220 Using the Edmond decision as a guide, the Missouri

213. Id. at 709.
214. Id.
215. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
216. The South Carolina checkpoint was a different kind of ruse. As motorists approached
Exit 22, they passed two large signs on the interstate reading “DRUG CHECKPOINT AHEAD.”
The first sign was posted 1000 feet before Exit 22, and the second was posted five hundred feet
before the exit. However, there was no drug checkpoint on Interstate 95. Instead, a checkpoint
was established at Exit 22’s exit ramp to verify the driver’s license and vehicle registration of
every motorist that exited. The decoy drug checkpoint signs were placed on the interstate
intending “that people carrying narcotics will become erratic, exit off the interstate, throw the
narcotics out or . . . cross the median and go back in the opposite direction.” United States v.
Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2000).
217. Id. at 355 n.1.
218. Id.
219. See id. See also State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 717 (Mo. 2002) (Stith, J., dissenting);
United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2002).
220. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 718 (Stith, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court should have found that the sole fact that a motorist exited a
highway cannot be enough to justify this type of drug enforcement tactic.
Certain individuals in the legal community with a heightened interest or
special knowledge in roadblock jurisprudence might contend that the
dissenting opinion in Edmond was as insightful, if not more so, than the
majority opinion. The dissent’s principal arguments were that the majority
completely ignored the established “Brown Balancing Test” in determining a
checkpoint’s constitutionality, and that the majority essentially invented this
“primary purpose” element not found anywhere in the language of the Fourth
Amendment. If the Missouri Supreme Court had applied the “Brown
Balancing Test,” the answer should have been just as clear as was the original
“primary purpose” test. If the United States Supreme Court found it necessary
to use the “Brown Balancing Test” in deciding Sitz, the Missouri Supreme
Court should have felt compelled to do so with Mack.
The Mack court could have applied the three-pronged “Brown Balancing
Test” in an easy, straightforward manner. The logic in applying the first prong
is the same as it was in Sitz.221 Much like the drinking and driving problem in
Sitz, few could deny the severity of the drug problem in the United States today
or the government’s interest in eliminating it. The War on Drugs is a constant
battle for government officials that many citizens would contend America is
losing.222
The second prong of the “Brown Balancing Test” is slightly more difficult
to understand and apply. The second prong weighs “the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest” and has evolved to the point that
empirical data factors into the decision. This is the area where the overall “hit
rate”223 becomes part of the equation. One of the principal reasons why the
Court in Prouse did not offer its acceptance of a strictly license and registration
checkpoint was because of the absence of any empirical data of the success of
such a checkpoint.224 In the Court-approved programs found in Sitz and
Martinez-Fuerte, the hit rates were 1.6%225 and 0.5%226 respectively. In both
of those instances, the Court found the success rates sufficient to pass
constitutional muster. The Supreme Court reversed its course when it found
that the nine percent hit rate in Edmond was insufficient to create the requisite

221. The Sitz Court stated, “No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken
driving problem or the States’ interests in eradicating it.” Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 451 (1990).
222. See id.
223. The overall hit rate refers to the ratio of the total number of arrests made at a certain
checkpoint compared to the total number of cars stopped at that checkpoint.
224. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
225. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. Out of one hundred and twenty six drivers detained at the
checkpoint, two motorists were arrested for drunken driving. Id. at 454.
226. Id. at 455 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
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amount of individualized suspicion to be considered constitutionally valid.227
The record-keeping procedures in Mack were so inconsistent that no accurate
percentages were provided, but from the raw data estimates, it seemed that the
“hit rate” was comparable to the percentages computed in Edmond. Courts
have concluded that to satisfy the second prong of the “Brown Balancing
Test,” the checkpoints do not have to be the most effective means of achieving
the State’s interests. The courts “need only decide whether, balanced with the
importance of the governmental interest and degree of intrusion, checkpoints
are at least reasonably effective as a tool in advancing the government’s
interest.”228 The Missouri Supreme Court could have determined that these
types of ruse checkpoints were “reasonably effective” in advancing the
government’s interest in removing drugs from Missouri roadways. However,
the small amount of empirical data revealing inconclusive hit rates found in
Mack refutes the argument provided by the State that the use of these ruse
checkpoints is so effective that this police technique should be elevated to level
all its own. This technique seems to be no more successful than any other
police technique for combating drugs.
The third prong of the “Brown Balancing Test” should have and would
have been the crux of the case had the Missouri Supreme Court used it to
arrive at its decision. Although the objective intrusion on the individual
motorist might have been as minimal as it was in Edmond or Damask,229 the
subjective intrusion in Mack certainly was not. In determining the level of
subjective intrusion, the critical factor is as follows:
[W]hether the checkpoint is planned and operated in such a manner as to
minimize the amount of discretion that officers at the scene may use in running
the checkpoint. Was the checkpoint conducted according to a plan prepared in
advance . . . were all vehicles stopped or, if not, were there specific, nondiscretionary criteria used to generate a random determination as to which
vehicles would be stopped, as opposed to some sort of discretionary selection
method?230

he Damask court continued, “[a] second element is also important to the
subjective intrusion analysis: the extent to which the stop might generate
concern or fright on the part of lawful travelers.”231 This comment is ironic
because the court in Damask did not find a substantial subjective intrusion on
motorists’ rights, even though the entire checkpoint operation in that case was
227. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35, 44 (2000). See also State v. Mack, 66
S.W.3d 706, 716 (Mo. 2002) (Stith, J., dissenting).
228. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 572 (Mo. 1996).
229. The stops in Edmond and Damask lasted for a couple minutes. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at
36; Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574.
230. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574.
231. Id. “The nature of the checkpoint and the presence of law enforcement personnel should
be readily ascertainable to motorists stopped at the checkpoint.” Id.
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designed to deceive unsuspecting motorists. The Mack checkpoint was
deceptive, patterned after the one in Damask, and unlike the regular,
permanent checkpoints in Edmond, Sitz, and the other previously-approved
checkpoint cases. The operator of the vehicle was not aware of the checkpoint
and was tricked into it. This element of unwanted surprise is relevant because
the average motorist is afraid of the police. The dissent in Sitz noted that,
“[t]hose who have found—by reason of prejudice or misfortune—that
encounters with the police may become adversarial or unpleasant without good
cause will have grounds for worrying at any stop designed to elicit signs of
suspicious behavior.”232
Anyone who has been driving in their car and has seen the flashing red and
blue lights in the rear-view mirror knows that police encounters are normally
unpleasant. People are instinctively apprehensive, even if they have not
broken any laws, when encountering police on the roadways. In addition to the
general fear of police, most ordinary motorists want to avoid delays on the
road whenever possible. Desiring to avoid delays and to avoid police officers
should not criminalize an individual, but according to the State of Missouri,
that is what these ruse checkpoints do. By prolonging the vitality of these
checkpoints in Missouri, the court promotes feelings of distrust and dislike
toward local police departments. If the Missouri Supreme Court had applied
the final prong of the “Brown Balancing Test” to the facts of Mack, it would
have seen that the subjective intrusion into the lives of individual motorists
was certainly not minimal. The level of surprise and fear that these ruse
checkpoints could generate are surely substantial enough to fail the final prong
of the Brown constitutionality test.
One important point of emphasis found in the Mack majority opinion,
which does not fit into the “Brown Balancing Test” package, is the fact that
Mack’s individual conduct might or might not have been part of the puzzle.
The majority sought to justify its decision by the fact that Mack drove his car
suspiciously while exiting the highway. The majority determined that
evidence of his sudden veering and almost missing his turn, “when coupled
with the deceptive checkpoint scheme, certainly compels a finding of
‘individualized’ suspicion.”233 The inherent flaw in this logic seems to be that
Mack’s particular conduct should not, and in fact did not, make any difference
under this particular checkpoint scheme. The checkpoint scheme itself was
unconstitutional. The dissent classified the majority’s reasoning with respect
to Mack’s driving conduct as “an after-the-fact rationalization made to justify a
stop that was clearly based on the fact that Mr. Mack exited the highway at the

232. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 465 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709-10 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). The court also noted “the
only reason [for introducing the evidence] was to show that the officers were even more
suspicious of this particular driver’s conduct.” Id. at 710 (emphasis in original).
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Old Cap Au Gris exit.”234 In Yousif, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
officer’s arguments that they possessed the required amount of individualized
suspicion because of the defendant’s conduct in exiting the highway. The
court there found, “All of these indicators, [i.e.] Defendant’s initial
hesitation . . . nervousness and shaking . . . and the overwhelming berryscented air freshener, would not exist but for the illegal checkpoint.”235 In
much the same manner, Mack could have been driving flawlessly, he could
have been driving backwards, or he could have been driving a tank, and the
situation in which he found himself would have remained the same. He was
stopped at the checkpoint not because he almost missed his turn, but simply
because he got off at the exit. That is exactly the type of checkpoint scheme
that is unreasonably intrusive on an individual motorist and should be
immediately ended.
The Mack dissent phrased the situation succinctly: “The driver would be
put in a ‘Catch-22’ of either proceeding down the highway and being stopped
at an unconstitutional checkpoint, or exiting to avoid it and risk being stopped
at a ruse checkpoint set up to catch those who had exited.”236 The dissent
realized that Edmond had already ruled any checkpoint designed for general
crime prevention purposes unconstitutional, even ones not set up as a ruse.
The fact that it was a surprise to the driver made the entire decision all the
more unpalatable. The dissent continued: “There is something fundamentally
unsettling and counter-intuitive about labeling as suspicious a person’s conduct
in avoiding the state’s own unconstitutional conduct.”237 The dissent wrote
convincingly and presented non-criminal reason upon reason that individuals
might have for avoiding a police-run drug checkpoint.238 The entire premise
that the ruse checkpoints created the requisite amount of individualized
suspicion was adequately refuted by the dissent and should have been afforded
more weight by the Mack majority.
The solution to this problem is not earth-shattering. The United States
Supreme Court revealed its true intentions on the subject of vehicle
checkpoints when it handed down the Edmond decision, and the Eighth Circuit
recognized that revelation in Yousif. The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision
in Mack is analogous to a fish out of water. The underlying tenet of the Fourth
Amendment is that an individual has a right to be free from “suspicionless
searches” unless certain, court-established special circumstances are present.
Therefore, a blanket rule prohibiting police departments across the country
from using ruse checkpoints as a method of combating the War on Drugs

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 720 (Stith, J., dissenting).
United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original).
Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 717 (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 716-17.
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seems to be the most simplistic and effective means of preventing further cases
like Mack from arising. America’s fight against drugs cannot come at the
expense of the total elimination of an individual’s constitutional rights. The
Edmond Court went to great lengths to stress the fact that its decision did not
alter the constitutionality of the border checkpoint cases, the sobriety
checkpoint cases, and even the driver’s license checkpoint cases.239 The Court
also noted, “[o]ur holding does not affect the validity of border searches or
searches at places like airports and government buildings, where the need for
such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute.”240 However,
the Edmond Court was equally as adamant about expressing its disapproval of
checkpoints with the primary purpose of general crime control. Individual
motorists must still be afforded some degree of security in an automobile.
V. CONCLUSION
Obviously, many in the legal community have differing views on the
subject of ruse checkpoints as evidenced by the numerous inconsistent
outcomes of checkpoint cases. The problem with the unpredictable results is
that the ruse checkpoint cases are capable of hitting close to home. The
scenario in this note is not a made-up, purely hypothetical, academic study.
There is a common, practical bond that these cases share. Any motorist,
especially any Missouri motorist, could fall victim to one of these traps. Many
drivers on the roads today might not have any idea that the police are even
using ruse checkpoints. In order for them to be spared from the surprise and
humiliation that Mack was faced with, the courts must not allow ruse
checkpoints to continue. Not only do these checkpoints fail to serve a
constitutional primary purpose, they are not extraordinarily effective, and they
are subjectively intrusive on the liberty rights of a motorist. Ruse checkpoints
will apparently continue for as long as the Missouri Supreme Court is allowed
to reach decisions like it did in Mack. To put an end to this, either a blanket
rule ending ruse checkpoints must become law in Missouri or the court must
change its thinking. Until this happens, Missouri motorists everywhere must
be on the lookout.
DUSTIN P. DESCHAMP

239. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).
240. Id. at 47-48.
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